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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LEONARD BLACK and VERA JOHNSON,
also known as Vera Johnson Black,
Plaintiffs and Respondents

vs.

DAVID F. ANDERSON, Judge of the
Juvenile Court of Washington
County, State of Utah, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.
8234

)
)
)
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Respondents agree substantially with the
Statement of Facts as presented by the Appellants
1
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in their brief.

We feel, however, that Appellants•

Statement of Facts is not sufficiently complete to
fully appraise the Court of the situation involved.
The first sentence of Appellants• Statement of Facts
is as follows:
"Vera Johnson also lmown as Vera Johnson
Black is the polygamous wife of Leonard Black and
from this unlawful relationship there have been
born eight children ranging, now from eighteen to
two years of age."
The marriage of Vera Johnson and Leonard Black
was entered into in obedience to Section 132 of
Doctrine and Covenants of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter Day Saints.

This relationship was enter-

ed into t.rith the firm understanding and belief that
said Section 132 is the Word of God, written in
the hand of Joseph Smith, His Prophet.

In living

in obedience to the admonitions of said Section 132,
these parents conscientiously felt that they were
2
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fulfilling a duty imposed upon them by God.
From this holy relationship there were born
eight children "ranging, now, from eighteen to
two years of age."

These children have been

raised in the home maintained by their parents
in Short Creek, Utah.

The rearing given these

children by their parents has been such that
the children have never been deprived of any of
the necessities of life, have always been
adequately clothed, fed, and housed, and under
the loving care of their parents they are all
developing into normal, healthy, intelligent
citizens of the State of Utah and of the United
States of America.
The parents of these children are, in
matters of religious faith, what are known as
Fundamentalist Mormons.

They, and those who

profess the same creed, hold to the tenets of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints
as that creed stood prior to the issuance and

3
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adoption by that church of the so-called "Manifesto"
of Wilford Woodruff in 1890.

They feel in

con~

science that Mormon Celestial or Plural Marriage
is the law of God today, even as it was when revealed as an "everlasting" covenant to the Prophet
Joseph Smith, and that any effort on the part of
men to change that or any law of God is as nothing, and that such an attempted change by men cartnot relieve men of the duties imposed upon them
by the Supreme Law-Giver.

Devoutly and sincerely

these parents entered into this relationship following God's Command, and, in obedience to all
the laws of marriage and chastity which surround
and protect Mormon Celestial or Plural Marriage
from the abuses and excesses which we otherwise
see about us on every side destroying the sacredness of marriage and the vitality of the American
family, they have had given to them by God this
grand family of eight children.
On page 2 of their brief the Appellants

4
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correctly set out what are Findings of Fact 17,
18, and 19 of the Juvenile Court, as follows:
"That the home of Leonard Black and
Vera Johnson Black at Short Creek, Utah,
is an immoral environment for the rearing
of said children.
"That Leonard Black, the father, and
Vera Johnson B.lack, the mother of said children, have each knowingly failed and neglected to provide for said children the proper
maintenance, care, training and education
contemplated and required by both law and
morals.
"That both the public welfare and the
welfare of the children requires that the
rights of custody and control over said children be taken from their parents."
In this connection it would seem appropriate
to point out that Finding of Fact 16 of the Juvenile Court is as follows:
"That there was no evidence that any of
the children were destitute and without
proper sustenance, clothing or medical care."

. The Juvenile· Court· :im its ·Finding .of Fact 13
found that these parents had not been living
5
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together as man and wife since July
stating that the reason for this

24, 1953,

beh~vior

was

"not because they have abandoned their religious
beliefs, but out of fear of criminal or juvenile
court action involving themselves and their children."

In other words, from a time prior to the

time the complaint was filed in the matter before
the Juvenile Court, continuing through the time
that court rendered its decision, through the date
on which the court took the actual custody of
these children forcibly from the arms of their
mother, through the present date, these parents
have not been practicing plural marriage and,
according to the finding of the Juvenile CoU+t
have refrained from doing so in deference to
civil authority, including that of. the Juvenile
Court itself.
Findings of Fact 17, 18, and 19 of the Juvenile Court, taken in conjunction with the other
6
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Findings of Fact, amount to a Conclusion of Law,
regardless of designation, and that conclusion
of law is to the effect that the

offsp~ing

of a

Mormon Celestial or Plural Marriage living in
the care and custody of their mother in a home
maintained by their parents, which parents no
longer cohabit as man and wife, are, by reason
of their birth and of the fact that the parents
still hold to their religious beliefs, neglected children under the law of this State.
On pages 2 and 3 of their brief Appellants
set out certain conditions which the Juvenile
Court imposed upon these parents as a condition
for them retaining actual custody of their children.

To the conditions (a), (b), and (c) set

out by the Appellants the Juvenile Court in its
Decree and Judgment had added conditions (d),

(e), and (f) which, for the convenience of the
court are a·s follows:
"(d)

That until further order of the
7
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court, the parents, and each of them, together
with all of the children, shall report in person once each month to the probation officer
or other designated representative of the Court
at Short Creek, Utah, on the 25th day of each
month commencing May 25, 1954, unless such
time and place of reporting be changed with
the approval of the Court.
"(e) That until further order of the
Court, the parents, and each of them, shall
submit to the Court each month at the times
mentioned in Paragraph (d) above, a written
sworn state~ent stating whether or not he or
she has complied with the conditions set forth
in subparagraph 3 (a) through (c) above, during the preceeding thirty days.
"(f) That each parent shall file with
the court on or before May 25th, 1954, a
sworn statement in writing to the effect that
he or she is willing to comply with the requirements set forth in sub-paragraph 3 (a)
through (e) above."
The conditions required by the Juvenile Court
amounted to a request to these parents to do an
affirmative act contravening their faith in God,
i. e., to deny their faith in God and to deny it
under oath.

The Juvenile Court would have had

these parents perjure themselves, not only in the
eyes of the court, but before God, as well.
For these reasons, the parents complained by
8
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writ of habeas corpus, as pointed out by
lants in their brief on page 3.

Appel~

The Appellants,

on pages 3 and 4 of their brief, set out the
pertinent portions of the decree of the Honorable
William Stanley Dunford, Judge, Fourth Judicial
District Court of the State of Utah in and for
Utah County, complaining of paragraph {b) of
that decree in which the court restored the
custody of the subject children to the parents
"upon the conditions, pending the appeal of the
above entitled case, that the parents do not live
together as man and wife, that they retain the
custody of the children within the geographic
bounds of the State of Utah and return them to
this court or to any other court which may have
jurisdiction at any time that they are ordered by
said court to do so."

The appellants feel, as

they state on page 4 of their brief, "that the
district court did err, after having considered
the legality of the restraint and ruled thereupon,

9
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by proceeding thereafter to adjudicate questions
going to the qualifications and fitness of the
parents to retain custody of their children."
Appellants then set out Findings of Fact 7 of the
District Court which is to the effect that it is
in the best interests of the children for them to

be under the custody of their parents.
The Appellants point out on page 3 of their
brief that:

"This appeal is being taken solely

for the purpose of determining what the law is,
in this State, as to matters subject to review

or collateral attack in habeas corpus proceedings."
The respondents feel that the District Court
acted properly in this matter in acting in the
best interests of the children, as it was compelled
to do under the law of this State, and that its
action should be sustained by this court on this
appeal.
10
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STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH
RESPONDENTS RELY
Point 1.

The Court acted properly in de-

claring the judgment of the Juvenile Court null
and void as in violation of Amendments One and
Fourteen of the Constitution of the United States
of America and of Article One of the Constitution
of the State of Utah.
Point 2.

The District Court in habeas

corpus proceedings involving custody of minors
must act as a court of equity and award custody
as the best interests of the minors shall indicate,
hearing and deciding all questions of fact involved
and making conclusions of law to achieve this end.
Point 3.

The Distri ct Court in restoring

the custody of the minors involved to their parents acted within its own jurisdiction and in
obedience to its own duties in such cases and not
in disturbance of the previously acquired juris11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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diction of the Juvenile Court.

ARGUMENT

Point 1.

The court acted properly in declar-

ing the judgment of the Juvenile Court null and
void as in violation of Amendments One and Fourteen
of the Constitution of the United States of America
and of Article One of the Constitution of the State
of Utah.
This point is intended to squarely controvert
Point 1 of Appellants' brief.

In their argument

to Point 1 on page 6 of their brief Appellants
make the following statement&
"A companion case pending before this
Honorable Court titled 'State of Utah, in the
Interest of Elsie Johnson Black, et al.,' seeks
an adjudication of the constitutionality of
the judgment of the juvenile court as declared
void in the proceedings from which we here appeal. Therefore, appellants request the Court's
permission to waive argument on this Point 1
for the reason that the said companion case
will resolve that issue."
12
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Respondents agree that the said companion
case, Case No. 8220, deals with the constitutionality of the Decree and Judgment of the Juvenile
Court.

We also request the Court's permission

to waive argument on this Point 1 "for the reason
that the said companion case will resolve that
issue."

Respondents wish to point out their

position that said Decree and Judgment of the
Juvenile Court is null and void in that it sets
up requirements which are contrary to the provisions of Sections 1, 4, 7, and 15 of Article 1
of the Constitution of Utah and Amendments 1 and

14 of the Constitution of the United States of
America, in that said requirements violate the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech
and freedom of religion.

Point 2.

The District Court in habeas

Corpus proceedings involving custody of minors
must act as a court of equity and award custody

13
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as the best interests of the minors shall indicate, hearing and deciding all questions of fact
involved and making conclusions of law to achieve
this end.
The Appellants cite the cas-e of JONES v.
MOORE, 61 Utah 383, 213 P. 191 (1923) as authority
for the proposition that

"In habeas corpus pro-

ceedings, nothing is inquired into except the
legality of the restraint."

The case may well

be authority for that proposition, but analysis
of that case will show that it is more correctly
authority for the proposition that a proceeding
involving the custody of minors is one which is
highly equitable in nat,xre and one which will be
decided in such a manner as to reflect the best
interests of the children involved.
In the case of JONES v. MOORE the plaintiff

soUght to obtain the custody of his minor daughter,
under two years of age, which child had been left
with the defendants, maternal grandparents, since

14
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birth.

In the original hearing below the defend-

ants won and had an award of custody.

Plaintiff,

however, filed a motion for a new trial and while
the motion was pending, the judge who heard the
case was retired from office.

The new judge

granted the motion after counsel had stipulated
that he should rule on it.

After a further

stipulation to that effect, the new judge ruled
on the evidence as presented in the original
hearing and gave custody to the plaintiff father.
The court in upholding the decision of the lower
court awarding the custody to the father considered this question:

"Can a case like the one at

bar be treated as a law case merely?"

The court

answered in the negative, saying that this type
of a case is an equitable proceeding.

The court,

Mr. Justice Frick writing the opinion, reasoned
as follows:
"While it is true that the proceeding,
in form at least, is habeas corpus proceeding, it is, however, so merely as a matter

15
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of convenience to the parties and to expedite
a hearing upon the issues. No case involving
the custody of minor children has ever been
tried or considered in this jurisdiction as
merely a habeas corpus proceeding, although
the case in form is such. In habeas corpus
proceedings nothing is inquired into except
the legality of the restrain+, and i f it be
found that the petitioner is illegally deprived of his liberty, but one conclusion is
permissible, and that is that the same must
be restored to him. Where, as here, however,
the sole issue involved is who shall have the
custody, care, and education of a child, and
especially one of tender years the inquiry
extends far beyond the ordinary issues involved in a habeas corpus proceeding. Cases
like the one at bar partake of all the incidents of a proceeding in equity. Indeed,
under our procedure, it has become a proceeding which is equitable in the highest
degree, as clearly appears from the decisions
in all of the cases decided by this court,
where the right to the custody, nurture, care,
and education of children was the controlling
issue. See Stanford v. Gray, 4Z Utah 229,
12 Pac. 423, Ann. Cas. 1916A., 989: Hummel v.
Parrish, 43 Utah 3?3, 134 Pac. 898; Harrison
v. Harker, 44 Utah 541, 142 Pac. 716; Farmer
v. Christensen, 55 Utah 1, 183 Pac. 328; Kurtz
v. Christensen (Utah} 209 Pac. 340. In view
of the equitabl~ nature of the proceeding,
this court, in Harrison v. Harker, supra,
held that the rule ap~1licable in equity cases
prevails, namely, that this court must examine
into the evidence, ~nd, in case the findings
of the trial court are clearly against the
evidence, they will not be upheld. In every
case of this character that has come before

16
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this court during the past 17 years while
the writer has been a member, the proceeding
has always been considered and treated as
equitable. The mere fact that such cases
are commenced under the habeas corpus statute in order to expedite a speedy hearing
and determination of the case cannot alter
the issues involved nor the nature of the
proceeding. Moreover, from time immemorial
the chancellors and not the law court have
determined the controversies respecting the
care, nurture, education, and custody of
minor children. The technicalities of the
law must therefore give way to the more
important questions, all of which appeal
most strongly to the conscience of the
chancellor. To that effect are all of the
decisions. There is therefore - there can
be - no merit to the contention that these
cases should be treated merely as law
cases, ••••"
The court in this case clearly quoted the
general rule as cited by the Appellants but, in
the language just set out, then went on to point
out that in cases involving the "custody, nurture,
care, and education of children" the court will
look "far beyond the ordinary issues involved
in a habeas corpus proceeding."

The Respondents

concede that the District Court in the instant
case went beyond the usual scope of inquiry in
17
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habeas corpus matters, but it did so because it
was required to do so by the very nature of the
case it was considering.

The District Court was

bound to inquire, in the nature of an inquiry as
by a court of equity, as to all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the custody of the minors
whose disposition it was, by the proceeding, called
upon to decide.
Such an inquiry is by its very nature bound
to be a broad one.

That it should be so broad

as to involve consideration by the District Court
of much the same facts and circumstances as would
be considered

qy

the Juvenile Court in a case of

alleged neglect is not surprising.
In speaking of the meaning of the term "best

interests" of the child as being determinative or
the courts' proper judgment in matters of this
nature, the court in the JONES case said,
"Without now pausing to go into the question of what may be involved within the term
'best interests', it must suffice to say that
18
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that term as it is understood and applied
in cases like the one at bar has reference
more particularly to the moral welfare than
to mere comforts, benefits, or advantages
that wealth can give. If such were not the
case, poor parents could not sustain their
right to the custody of a child in which a
rich man has taken a special interest, and
where between himself and the cl,.ild there
exists a strong liking or affection. It is
the comparatively poor and not the rich parents who rear the large fa~ilies and who
give to the world a large majority of the
men and women who conduct its affairs. Unless, therefore, a parent has by his acts
and conduct in some way forfeited or lost
the right to custody of his minor child the
presumptions respecting his right to have
such custody are all in his favor. If the
cases of this character heretofore decided
by this court are critically examined, it
will be found that such is the spirit that
pervades all of them ••• "
It is readily seen that the duty of determining, in cases of this sort, what is in the
best interests of the children is a very partieular and highly important duty.

It is easy to

conceive that the District Court in making this
inquiry may have uncovered certain facts which
did not come to the attention of the Juvenile
Court which compelled it to come to a legal

19
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conclusion at complete variance to that arrived
at by the Juvenile Court.

Could the District

Court escape its judicial duty of considering
what was to the best interests or the children by
pointing to the fact that the Juvenile Court make
certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
with reference to the family before it in a
matter brought before that Juvenile Court on a
petition alleging neglect?

The rule of the JONES

case indicates no circumstance or set of circumstances under which the District Court, in a habeas
corpus proceeding properly brought before it

in~

volving the custody of minors, may escape this
obligation.
The rule of the JONES case is still the rule
by which the courts of this State are bound.

The

JONES case was reaffirmed by the case of CHAPMAN

v. GRAHAM, ____Utah____ , 270 P. (2d) 821 (1954).
In this case Chapman had obtained a writ of habeas

corpus releasing him from confinement at the State
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Prison.

The writ was granted on grounds that

Chapman had been subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment, in that, the prison officials had
refused to permit him to return to the Mayo Clinic
in Minnesota for certain surgery.

Chapman had

previously been paroled so that he might undergo
treatment at the Mayo Clinic but had been returned to prison for a parole violation.

This court

on the appeal ruled that Chapman had not been
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment and
that he should not have been discharged as a result of the habeas corpus proceeding.

This court

also held that the lower court under the circumstances should have made the discharge conditional.
In the opinion of the court written by

Mr.

Justice Henroid, the function of the writ of habeas
corpus is dealt with as follows:
"Use of the writ in a case like this
would pierce and wound the administrative
processes of constitutionally created executive agencies with a habeas corpus lance
thrust by the judiciary. Almost universally
such use has been condemned, and the function
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of habeas corpus has been confined to a
single test: That of legality of restraint
(Coburn v. Schroeder, 71 Olk. Cr. 405, 112
P. 2d 191; Kauble v. Haynes, D. c., 64 F.
Supp. 153; Sarshik v. Sanford, 5 Cir., 142
F. 2d 676; Edmondson v. Warden, 194 Md. 707,
69 A. 2d. 919; Ex parte Pickens, D. c., 101
F. Supp. 285; Siegel v. Ragen, D. c., 88 F.
Supp. 996. Contra: Harper v. Wall, D. c.,
85 F. Supp. 783.), even to the exclusion of
those cases where an individual's health has
been shown to be in jeopardy. We have adopted such view in Jones v. Moore, 1923, 61 Utah
383, 213 P. 191, 193, where we said that 'In
habeas corpus proceedings nothing is inquired
into except the legality of the restraint.'
We re-affirm that principle as it applies to
cases like this and as applied to child custody cases where the welfare of children may
lend a different complexion to, but not a
basic difference in the principle •••
"We prefer to adhere to the principle,
until that rare case approaches which to
date we have not encountered, that courts,
b,y means of the writ, will not interfere with
the management, control or internal affairs,
nor will they, nor can they substitute their
judgment in discretionary matters for those
of administrative agencies of a different
department of government. • • "
This case, as is pointed out by the Appel!'""
lants is authority for the general rule that, "In
habeas coTpUs proceedings nothings is inquired
into except the legality of the restraint."

The
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The court said that it reaffirmed "that principle
as it applied to cases like this and as applied
to child custody cases where the welfare of children may lend a different complexion to, but not
a basic difference in the principle ••• "

The

court there recognizes the peculiar nature of
cases involving the custody of

ch~ldren.

They

are cases in which "the welfare of children may
lend a different complexion to, but not a basic
difference in the principle."

The court did not

overrule the JONES case, but, rather, it seems
to have emphasized the rule of that case.

It

seems to have pointed out the obvious, that, in
cases involving the custody of children, the
inquiry as to the legality of the restraint must
go far and beyond the inquiry made in an ordinary
habeas corpus matter.

Naturally, the very

broad scope of such an inquiry might lead one to
feel that these cases are outside the rule;
however, as the court so carefully points out
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"the welfare of children" in these cases "may
lend a different complexion to, but not a basic
difference in the principle."
When the District Court in the instant case
inquired into the fitness of these parents to
have the care and custody of these children, it
did so in order to determine whether these children were illegally restrained.

In making its

inquiry it must be governed by the rules constraining all courts.

It must get the facts,

make its findings and draw its legal conclusions.
The District Court in this case made its inquiry.
It had witnesses before it, it listened to their
testimony.

The District Court then made its

findings of fact and conclusions of law while
cognizant of the fact that it was required to act
under the cases

~s

in the nature of a court of

equity and in the best interests of the children.
The rule of the JONES case, that cases involving the custody of minors are cases equitable
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in nature which must be decided in the best
interests of the children involved, has been
followed and reenunciated in all cases where these
questions have been raised.

We note a few of

these cases in passing.
WALLICK v. VANCE, 76 Utah 209, 289 P. 103
(1930) was a case in which the father of a
minor child appealed from a decree of the lower
court awarding custody of his daughter to her
aunt, the father's sister.

The court in that

case, having the question of custody of a minor
before it, upheld the lower court in its action
in deciding the question of

c~tody

so as to best

serve the child's welfare and interests.
HARDCASTLE v. HARDCASTLE, 118 Utah 192, 221

P. (2d) 883 (1950), although not a habeas corpus
matter but a matter involving a petition to modify a divorce so as to obtain custody of a minor
child, is another case in which the best interests
of the child was the decisive issue in the case.
25
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In IN RE BRADLEY, 109 Utah 539, 167 P. (2d)
978, (1946), the mother of a minor child appealed
from the Juvenile Court's denial of her petition
that the custody be returned to her.

The Supreme

Court upheld the Juvenile Court but ruled, on page
984 (P.), as follows:
"Before determining this question we
call attention to the fact that cases involving the custody of a child are cases in equity
and this court is required to determine the
facts as well as the law. Harrison v. Harker,
supra; Jones v. Moore, 61 Utah 383, 213 P.
191; Jensen v. Earley, supra; Wallick v. Vance,
76 Utah 209, 289 P. 103."
In BALDWIN

v. NIELSON, 110 Utah 172, 170 P.

(2d)l79 (1946), the rehearing of which case appears
in the reports at 110 Utah 180, 174 P. (2d) 437
(1946), a father by habeas corpus sought custody
of his minor son from the family of the child's
deceased mother.

In agreeing with the decision of

the lower court awarding custody to the father, the
court in both opinions followed the rule that in
cases of this kind the most important consideration
26
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is what will be for the best interests and
welfare of the child.
WALTON v. COFFMAN, 110 Utah 1, 169 P. (2d)

97 (1946) is a habeas corpus case involving the
custody of a minor.
equity case.

The court said it was an

The court, Mr. Justice Wade writing

the opinion, on page lOO(P.), went into the
question of the office of the writ of habeas
corpus in cases involving the custody of children, as follows:
"Under the English Common law, originally, the writ of habeas corpus was used only
in cases of arrest or forceable restraint
under claim of authority of law. Later it
was broadened to cover all kinds of cases
where one person forceably restrained another
of his liberty whether under claim of authority of law or not and in cases where the
restraint was such that the person restrained
was unable to make application in person for
the writ, other persons were allowed to do
so in his behalf and this applied in cases
of children as well as adults. In all of
these cases originally, at least in theory,
i f the court found that there was unlawful
restraint, it merely ordered the person freed
from the restraint. But in cases of small
children unable to exercise mature judgment
in such matters, who are always the wards of
27
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someone, they were held to be the wards of
courts of equity, and such courts tried out
the question, usually, of which of two contending parties should have the custody of
the child. In so doing, courts of equity,
as the sovereign power exercising the king's
conscience, made the choice for the child,
and placed the child in the custody of the
person where its best interests and welfare
would be subserved. This jurisdiction of
equity had developed long before the American revolution ••• This jurisdiction has
been followed in the states and it is generally held that the determining factor is
the best interest and welfare of the child ••• "
The District Court in the instant case was
faced with a situation in which both plaintiffs
and defendants claimed they should have the care
and custody of these children.

Confronted with

this situation in a habeas corpus matter what was
the court required to do?

First of all, it had

to inquire into the legality of the restraint.
It had to answer at the very beginning the question as to whether these children were properly
being held by the parties designated to care for
them by the Utah State Department of Public Welfare.
In answering that question, it had to determine
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whether the decision of the Juvenile Court awarding the custody of these children to the Utah
State Department of Public Welfare was a correct
one, and if it were an imporper decision, were

its faults such as might be corrected on appeal
or were they such as to result in a void judgment

If, as found by the Dis-

by the Juvenile Court.

trict Court, the judgment of the Juvenile Court
was so violative of human rights guaranteed

~

the Constitution of United States of America
and by the Constitution of the State of Utah as
to be utterly void, the court then had no alternative; it had to release the children from the
unlawful restraint.
It seems to be the position of the Appellants
as expressed in their brief that the District
Court should have stopped with the discharge,
that it should not have restored the custody of
the children to their parents and especially that
it should not have inquired into the fitness of
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the parents to have the care and custody of their
children.

Having determined that the Decree and

Judgment under which the children were being restrained was unconstitutional and void and being
faced with the necessity of discharging the children, the District Court then had a situation before
it wherein children, who had been taken from the
custody of their parents and placed in the custody
of the State Department of Public Welfare, were now
to be discharged from the custody of that department.

Was the District Court free, then to dis-

charge these children, minors of tender age, and
to place them in the custody of no one, or did
it have the obligation as a court of equity to
consider the fact that these minors should be
placed in the custody of persons capable of taking
care of them and to decide the question as to who
were the proper persons to have custody?
The question would seem logically to answer
itself.

The District Court, as a court of equity,

30
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could not have released these children from the
illegal restraint imposed upon them by the Juvenile Court and have provided for them nothing
further.

There was no way for the District Court

to evade the obvious question:

Who are the prop-

er parties to have the custody of these children?
There is always a presumption in favor of the
parents when such a question is presented.

The

parents were before the Court seeking the custody
of their children.

The Court had the clear obli-

gation of determining the fitness of the parents
to have custody.

This it did, and it restored

the custody of the children to the parents.

Cer-

tainly, its Findings of Fact on this issue are at
variance with those made by the Juvenile Court.
The Findings of Fact of the District Court are
clearly supported by the evidence presented before it.
fact.

Even the Appellants do not dispute this

The District Court would not have been able

to have ignored the evidence presented before it
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and have refused these parents the care and custody
of their children and to have given as its reason
for doing so the fact that the Juvenile Court had
determined that these parents were unfit.

The

District Court was certain from the testimony of
the witnesses who had appeared before it that these
parents were the proper persons to have the care and
custody of their children.

It had no alternative

but to restore that custody to those parents.
The Appellants conclude that the District
Court had no right to consider the matter of the
parents' fitness to have the custody of their
children, and they cite on page 7 of their brief
the case of EX PARTES. H., 1 Utah (2d) 186, 264
P. (2d) 850 (1953) as authority for the proposition
nthat matters reviewable on appeal, but which do
not go to the juvenile court's jurisdiction are not
subject to review or collateral attack in habeas
corpus proceedings."
In the case of EX PARTES. H., a 13 year old
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boy had been sent to the Industrial School by the
Juvenile Court.

His mother sought a writ of habeas

corpus in the court below on grounds that (1) he
was too young, (2) there was no finding that she
was unfit to have his custody and (3) that her
son was returned to the school without a hearing
after he had been allowed to return to his mother.
The questions presented to the Court were:

{1) Are

(1) and (2) above proper subjects of

inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings? and (2)
Is a hearing necessary before returning a child
on probation to the Industrial School?
The Court held in this case that inquiry as
to (1) and (2) should properly be on appeal and
that a hearing was not necessary before returning a child to the Industrial School but the
authorities must have good reason for doing so
and the burden of proving lack of good reason is
on the

perso~

so contending, proof of which lack

must be clear and convincing.
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The reasoning of the Court on these points,

Mr. Justice Henroid writing, is as follows:
"As to (1) and (2): These matters are
reviewable on appeal, but do not go to the
Juvenile Court's jurisdiction, and are not
subject to review or collateral attack in
habeas corpus proceedings (u.s. v. Valante,
264 U.S. 563, 44 S. Ct. 411, 68 L. Ed. 850).
As to (3): Under our statutes the Public
Welfare Commission, and hence its agency,
the Industrial School, has continuing jurisdiction over a committed child, and may expand
and contract the walls of the institution as
the welfare of the child dictates (64-6-8 u.
C.A.). However, it could not be construed to
operate as a device for oppression, and this
court, in a proper case, would not hesitate
to intercede if it faced a situation where the
authorities had acted under the statute without good reason, capriciously or arbitrarily.
There appears to be no proof of any such unreasonableness in the record here.
"'In this case an offer of proof was made
with respect to the fitness of the mother, but
none as to the unreasonableness of the School
authorities' action, the petition having stated only in the form of a conclusion that the
boy had been returned without a 'legal hearing', and the matter having been made the
subject of but a brief colloquy between court
and counsel. Consequently, the trial court
was justified in refusing to entertain jurisdiction in a habeas corpus proceeding, to
review the merits of the case before the Juvenile Court. There is no question but that the
Juvenile Court had jurisdiction over
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children 13 years of age, and over the subject matter relating to parents• fitness
to have custody. In truth, the Juvenile
Court enjoys far wider jurisdiction and
very well may commit a delinquent to the
Industrial School for cause even though
his parents are eminently fitted to have
its custody."
It should be noted that in EX PARTE S. H.
we have a case where a juvenile delinquent has
been committed to the Industrial School.

The

instant case is one in which children have been
taken from their parents because of the alleged
neglect by the parents.

The matters not proper

for consideration in a habeas corpus action with
reference to the particular situation appearing
in EX PARTE S. H. were whether the juvenile was
to young and the question of the fitness of the
mother to have his custody.

The Court pointed

out that there was no question that the Juvenile
Court had jurisdiction over children 13 years
of age and that the Juvenile Court could "commit
a delinquent to the Industrial School for cause
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even though his parents are eminently fitted to
have its custody."

The holding in that case that

the matters considered "do not go to Juvenile
Court's jurisdiction and are not subject to
review or collateral attack in habeas corpus proeeedingsn does not mean that the District Court
in the instant case was wrong in considering

the fitness of the parents to have the custody
of their children after it had determined that
the children were being restrained under a void
Decree and Judgment.
The Appellants point out, on page 8 of their
brief, that confusion has arisen from the case
of JENSEN v. SEVY, 103 Utah 220, 134 P. (2d) 1081
(1943).

The case would seem to be of sufficient

importance to merit a more detailed analysis.
The Juvenile Court had with consent of the
plaintiff father entered an order declaring his
daughter a ward of the court and dividing her
custody on a semi-annual basis between her grand-
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parents, the mother having died.
tiff remarried, he sought custody.

When the plainThe Juvenile

Court then issued an order to the effect that if
the plaintiff's behavior was proper until a certain date he could then have custody, the juvenile
court expressly retaining jurisdiction.
appealed that order.

Plaintiff

The date having passed be-

fore the appeal was heard, the plaintiff applied
to the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus;
the court issued the writ and made it returnable
before District Judge, John L. Sevy, Jr.

Judge

Sevy refused to consider the matter and dismissed the writ.

Plaintiff then applied to the

Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus requiring
Judge Sevy to hold a hearing on the writ of
habeas corpus.

The court issued an alternative

writ requiring the judge to hold the hearing or
show cause.

The judge elected to show cause.

The court itself posed 5 questions for decision.
Question 5 is as follows:
37
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"Is the jurisdiction of the Juvenile
Court over minors so exclusive as to divest
the Supreme Court or the District Courts of
jurisdiction, to inquire qy habeas corpus,
into the legality of the restraint of a
ward of the Juvenile Court, exercised by
any person, either under an order of the
Juvenile Court or otherwise?"
Three opinions were filed in the case.

The

portions of them dealing with this question are
set out.

The opinion of Mr. Justice Larson is in

part as follows:
"The District Court was mindful of the
provisions of Sec. 14-7-4, R. S. u. 193.3
which reads: 'The juvenile court shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
relating to the neglect, dependency and delinquency of children •••• , and the custody,
detention, guardianship of the person •••• of
such •••• children. ' (Italics added) • And
subdivision (3) of the section which reads:
'When jurisdiction shall have been acquired
by the court in the case of any child, such
child shall continue for the purposes of
such case under the jurisdiction of the
court ••• 1

"'(4) Nothing herein contained shall
deprive other courts of the right to determine the custody of children upon writs of
habeas corpus ••••• Such other courts ~Y.!
however, decline to pass upon questions or
custody and may certify the same to the
juvenile court for hearing and determination
or recommendation.' (Italics added). And
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that pursuant to such statute he intended
the order to be that he 'declined to pass
upon questions of custody' and left the
same for determination by the Juvenile
Court... The District Court concluded
that since petitioner admitted he had not
made a showing to the Juvenile Court as
provided in its order, he was not entitled
to custody under the order of the Juvenile
Court; and since the order itself was valid,
he was not entitled to custody in derogation
of it. It held therefor that the detention
of the child by the grandparents was lawful
and under valid legal process; that the right
to modify the Juvenile Court order lay only
in that court or in the Supreme Court by
appeal, and therefor petitioner was not entitled to have the child discharged from
the custody of its grandparents. In this
we think the District Court was right and
the alternative writ of mandamus is recalled
and quashed." Moffat, J. concurred.
Wolfe, C. J. concurred in the result, but said:
"The opinion of Judge Hoyt expresses rrry
opinion on the reason and interpretation of
the action of the District Court in refusing
to take jurisdiction of the question raised
by the writ of habeas corpus and the intention
of the District Court in dismissing the writ.
It also expresses my opinion that where the
Juvenile Court has obtained jurisdiction of
a child because of neglect, dependency or
delinquency, the District Court must dismiss
the writ. It is not discretionary. The
orders of the Juvenile Court are appealed to
this court under Sec. 14-7-33, Utah Code Ann.
1943, and the judgment of the Juvenile Court
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cannot be overturned by suing out a writ and
obtaining a hearing on the very same issue
by that method either in the District or the
Supreme Court."
Hoyt, D. Judge, concurred in the result,
but said
n ••• I think it reasonable clear that
what the court did was to hear the habeas
corpus matter and, finding that the child
involved had been taken into the custody of
the· Juvenile Court, because of neglect or
misconduct of the father (petitioner) and
that the juvenile court had retained jurisdiction of the matter, the district court
concluded, and I think rightly, that it
had no jurisdiction to take the child from
the custody of the juvenile court or to
determine the question of the father's
fitness to have his child returned to him •••
n ••• I think it was the inte-ntion of
the district court to hold that it had no
jurisdiction to hear and determine the
question of the father's fitness and qualification to have his child returned to him.
I cann~t agree with ..the_ holding inf~r- ·
able from the opinion that the district court
could have proceeded to hear and determine
that question. In my opinion it was not a
matter of discretion. I think the legislature intended to confer exclusive original
jurisdiction upon the juvenile court to
determine such questions in every case wherein the state had become a party by the juvenile court taking custody of a child because
of neglect or delinquency. The provisions
of subsection 4 of section 14-7-4 R. S. re-
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lating to powers of courts to determine
questions of custody in habeas corpus prodeedings should not, in my opinion, be construed to apply to cases in which the state
has become a party by intervention of the
juvenile court. Unless we so construe it
we cannot reasonably give effect to the
provision of subsection 3 of section 14-7-4
that 'when jurisdiction shall have been acquired by the court in the case of any child,
such child shall continue for the purposes
of such case under the jurisdiction of the
court until he becomes twenty-one years of
age, unless discharged prior thereto or unless he is committed to the state industrial
school or to the district court as hereinafter
provided •••• 1
"It is a sufficient answer to a writ of
habeas corpus to show that a child is held
pursuant to the terms of a valid order made
after due notice and hearing qy· the juvenile
court in a case in which the juvenile court
had jurisdiction •••• To hold otherwise is
to hold that by reason of subsection 4 of
Section 14-7-4 R.S. the district courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile
courts in cases of alleged neglect of children. I cannot believe that it was so
intended."
The confusion resulting from the case may well
spring from the fact that the opinion of Mr. Justice
Larson, concurred in by Mr. Justice Moffat, is
found first in the reports, while the opinion of
Chief Justice Wolfe concurring in the result but
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in the reasoning of Judge Hoyt is next in order,

followed by the opinion of Judge Hoyt concurring
in the result but employing reasoning differing

from that of Mr. Justice Larson, Judge Hoyt's
opinion being concurred in by Mr. Justice
McDonough.
A great deal of the confusion, however,
may arise from a failure to note these words of
Judge Hoyt:
~It is a sufficient answer to a writ
of habeas corpus to show that a child is held
pursuant to the terms of a valid order made
after due notice and hearing b.Y the juvenile
court in a case in which the juvenile court had
jurisdiction."

The order must be a valid order.
stant case the order was invalid.

In the in-

It was void.

It was an order violating constitutional

guarantees

of human freedom and was in excess of the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court to make.

If we agree

that the opinion of Judge Hoyt is the prevailing
opinion of the court in the JENSEN v. SEVY case,
we must still conclude that such did not preclude
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the District Court from proceeding as it did in
the instant case.
Section 55-10-5

(4), Utah Code Annotated

(1953} is as follows:
"Nothing herein contained shall deprive
other courts of the right to determine the
custody of children upon writs of habeas
corpus, or when such custody is incidental
to the determination of causes in such courts.
Such other courts may, however, decline to
pass upon questions of custody and may certify the same to the juvenile court for hearing and determination or recommendation."
Even without such a provision the statute
conferring jurisdiction on the juvenile courts
could not have constitutionally infringed upon the
power of courts generally to protect

cit~zens

from

illegal restraint by use of the writ of habeas
corpus.

This provision appearing in the statute,

there can be no contention that the legislature,
in giving the juvenile courts exclusive jurisdiction of cases of neglect or delinquency of
children, intended to infringe upon the traditional
authority of the courts to act with the power of
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the writ of habeas corpus in cases appropriate for
its exercise.
The JENSEN v. SEVY case is certainly not
authority for the proposition that the District
Courts may never intervene by means of the writ
of habeas corpus after the Juvenile Courts have
acted in a matter involving the neglect, dependency,
or delinquency of children.

To use the example

and language of Judge Dunford in his Memorandum
Decision in the instant case,

"In plain reason it could not be contended that the rule would prevent intervention of the Supreme Court by means of
Habeas Corpus under all, or any, conditions,
Could that decision be reasonably interpreted
as holding that i f a Juvenile Court so far
departed from reason that in a charge of
dependency of a five-year old child, he sentenced it to 20 years in the State penitentiary,
and the executive officers were likewise so
bereft that they executed the judgment, that
the child would have to languish in an institution for felons while the slower processes
of appeal were made effective? It doesn't
seem so, Clearly in such circumstances,
Habeas Corpus would lie, because such a judgment would transcend all legal authority of
the court and its officers, and would be in
gross violation of the Constitutional rights

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the child. Such a situation would be
quite distinctive from a mere irregularity,
such as failing to set and notice a hearing
of a claimed violation of probation which
cannot be reviewed upon Habeas Corpus as
held by our court in Stoker v. Gowans, 147
P. 911.
"Habeas Corpus has always been, and may
always be, resorted to to protect the Constitutional rights of an individual under unlawful distraint, even though there may also
exist a right of correction by appeal when
the distraint results from an unlawful or
void judgment."
The logic of this position seems

incont~o-

vertible.
The Appellants, on page 9 of their brief,
suggest that the "discharge of the children could
have been made conditional by the court, either
upon review of the holding of the district court
or upon the outcome of an appeal from the finding,
as to neglect, of the juvenile court.

CHAPMAN v.

GRAHAM, supra."·
In the CHAPMAN case, the criminal case discussed above, the court spoke of such a conditional discharge in the opinion written by Mr.
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Justice Henroid as follows:
"In passing, we are constrained to
suggest that in this case the trial court more
properly could have made the petitioner's
discharge conditional upon affirmance by us
or upon failure of appeal within the prescribed time, or knowing that this prisoner
would depart the state posthaste upon his
release admitted him to bail in order to
assure his return to proper custody should
this court happen to disagree, as we have,
with the trial court. Both procedures we
have approved (Dickson v. Mullings, 66 Utah
282, 241 P. 840), although we are aware
that a different conclusion was reached in
early cases touching the matter. (41 Harv.
Law Rev.)"

In his concurring opinion Mr. Justice Crockett
felt that if there had been cruelty,
"The Court could very well order a
discontinuance of the cruelty. The prisoner's
discharge would not be indicated unless that
was the only way to relieve the situation.
At most, the discharge could be conditioned
upon failure to comply with the order to correct it. The remedy would not be to peremtorily grant the prisoner's release •• "
Reasons for making a discharge conditional
in a case such as the CHAPMAN case may well not
be present in a case such as the instant case.

There would seem to have been nothing to indicate
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in the instant case that the children were going
to be spirited out of the jurisdiction of our
courts or that they would not be voluntarily
surrendered to our courts upon request to the
parents that they do so.

It would seem, none-

theless, that the District Court did make its
judgment conditional.

In its judgment quoted

by the Appellants, on page 4 of their brief,
the District Court restored the custody of the
children to the parents "upon the conditions,
pending the appeal of the above entitled case,
that the parents do not live together as man
and wife, that they retain the custody of the
children within the geographic bounds of the
State of Utah and return them to this court
or to any other court which may have jurisdiction at any time that they are ordered by
said court to do so."

Not only did the Dis-

trict Court make its discharge conditional as
suggested by the CHAPMAN case, but it was careful not to disturb the jurisdiction of any other
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court.

The District Court made no attempt to

deprive the Juvenile Court of its continuing
jurisdiction which it obtained by virtue of
the statute.
The District Court in the action taken by
it in the instant case, in considering the question of fitness of the parents to have custody
of their children, did not disturb the previously acquired jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court,
but was, in fact, most careful not to do so.
In making the inquiry it made, the District Court

did nothing more than perform the obligation
imposed upon the district courts whenever they
have before them a matter involving the

q~stody

of children.

POINT 3.

The District Court in restoring

the custody of the minors involved to their parents acted within its own jurisdiction and in
obedience to its own duties in such cases and not
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in disturbance of the previously acquired jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court.
The jurisdiction of the District Court in
cases in which it must decide the custody of children, as has been discussed under Point 2, is the
jurisdiction of a court of equity charged with
making its decision in the best interests of the
children involved.

In exercising this jurisdic-

tion the District Court does not infringe upon
the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court.

It may

differ in its findings with the Juvenile Court,
but it acts as an independent court upon the
evidence and testimony presented before it.
No one can disagree with the statement of
the Appellants, on page 11 of their brief, "that
had there been no question raised as to the legality of the restraint of these children, the
Honorable Court below would have dismissed the
writ;"

Legality of the restraint is the basic

issue presented in any habeas corpus proceeding.
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If there is no illegal restraint, there can be

no relief by habeas corpus.
The Appellants then continue, on page 11 of
their brief, to state that the District Court
would have dismissed the writ •upon the ground
that the issues raised (as to the parents• fitness, right to custody, neglect, delinquency,
etc.) were not subject to review in habeas corpus
p~oceedings.

This is the well established law

of this State."
This latter statement would give one the
impression that under no circumstances could
these issues ever be raised by means of a
habeas corpus proceeding.

The Appellants are

apparently asking this court to so declare.
The lives of little children should be
tampered with by the State for only the gravest
reasons.

It children are taken from their

parents for reasons insufficient to empower
the Juvenile Court to so disrupt their lives,
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other courts will, and should intervene by habeas
corpus to protect the fundamental human rights
inherently possessed by every citizen of this State
and of the United States of America, whether such
citizens be adults or minors.
Surely it is not the law of this State, that
should a Juvenile Court declare parents unfit and
take the custody of their children from them by making a finding of neglect when it has had before it
not one iota of evidence to support such a finding,

that the District Courts and the Supreme

Court are powerless to invoke the great protecting arm of the age-old writ of habeas corpus to
release such children and return them to their
parents but that the children and the parents
must await the slow, tedious processes of appeal
to be restored to a condition from which they
should never have been removed in the first place.
The lives of our children are too precious.
Irreparable harm can be done a child by forcibly
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tearing it from its mother's arms, even for an
instant.

Irreparable harm was undoubtedly done

to the Black children by being forcibly torn from
their home and parents even for the short period
of one week, as happened in the instant case.
The kind of a decision which the Appellants ask
this court to make is one which could make tyrants
of juvenile judges and which could ruin the lives
of countless honorable citizens of this State.
Think of the heartaches, of the broken homes, of
the tortured minds of children which might result
should a Juvenile Court decide to take the custody
of children from their parents for reasons not in
the record, if that court's finding, under any
circumstances, for any reasons, regardless of
how arbitrary and abusive that court might be of
human liberties, could never be challenged save
by the method of appeal.

The office _of the writ

of habeas corpus to relieve from unlawful restraint
in order to prevent irreparable harm would be
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destroyed.
The writ of habeas corpus is one of the
oldest safeguards of human liberty born of English Jurisprudence.
lightly sapped.

Its strength is not to be

Its great protecting arm is

not to be strapped behind Justice's back.
Human liberties are not so casually to be
trampled into the dust.
The general rule, of course, is that a writ
of habeas corpus cannot be utilized for the purpose of proceedings in error.
EX PARTE HUDGINS, 249 U.S. 378, 39 S. Ct•

337 (1919) throws some light on the office of
the writ of habeas corpus when exceptional circumstances are presented.

In this case the Dis-

trict Judge had sentenced a witness for contempt,
the Judge feeling that the witness was failing
to tell the truth on the witness stand.

The writ

of habeas corpus having been brought in the U. S.
Supreme Court, Mr. Chief Justice White in his
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opinion considered the general rule with respect
to the application of the writ of habeas corpus
and found that the District Court under the facts
of the case had exceeded its power and that habeas
corpus did properly lie.

The opinion on page 384

{U. S.) states as follows:

"In view of the nature of the case, of
the relation which the question which it
involves bears generally to the power and
duty of courts in the performance of their
functions, of the dangerous effect on the
liberty of the citizen when called upon as
a witness in a court which might result i f
the erroneous doctrine upon which the order
under review was based were not promptly
corrected, we are of opinion that the case
is an exception to the general rules of procedure to which we have at the outset referred, and therefore that our duty exacts
that we finally dispose of the questions in
the proceeding for habeas corpus which is
before us."
Another case in which the office of the writ
is discussed is SUNAL v. LARGE, 332

s.

Ct. 1588, 91 L. Ed. 1982, (1947).

u.s.

174, 67

The case

involved convictions under the Selective Training
and Service Act of 1940 and came to the Supreme
Court of the United States by certiorari from
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denials of writs of habeas corpus in the lower
courts.

The prevailing opinion of Mr.

J~stice

Douglas held that the defendants, having failed
to take an appeal, could not later have their
convictions reviewed by a habeas corpus proceeding.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting

opinion states on p.l85 (U.S.) et. seq,
"The extent to which this court has
left itself unhampered by not drawing sharp
jurisdictional lines, is indicated by the
following very tentative classification of
categories in which habeas corpus has not
been deemed beyond the power of federal
courts to entertain."
The Justice then cites eight different sitations, citing many cases and concludes on page

187

(u.s.),

as follows:

"Perhaps it is well that a writ the
historic purpose of which is to furnish
'a swift and imperative remedy in all cases
of illegal restraint', see Lord Birkenhead,
L.C., Secretary of State for Home Affairs v.
O'Brien, (1923) A.C. 6o3, 609, should be
left fluid and free from the definiteness
appropriate to ordinary jurisdictional doctrines. But if we are to leave the law
pertaining to habeas corpus in the unsystematized condition in which ·we find it, then
55
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I believe it is true of both cases what Judge
Learned Hand said of the Kulick case, that
the writ is necessary 1 to prevent a complete
miscarriage of justice•. 157 F 2d. 811,
813. If the justification need be no more
definite than the existence of 'exceptional
circumstances', Bowen v. Johnston, 306 u.s.
19, 27, the reasons for allowing the writs
in these cases are more compelling than were
those in Bowen v. Johnston, where there
merely appeared 1 to be uncertainty and confusion ••• Whether offenses within the •••
National Park are triable in the state or
federal courts.• •••• "

Mr. Justice Rutledge, also dissenting, on
page 187, et seq., states ·
ni am in agreement with Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in the result and substantially
in the views he expresses. I would modify
them by making definite and certain his
tentatively expressed conclusion that the
great writ of habeas corpus should not be
confined by rigidities characterizing ordinary jurisdictional doctrines. And I
agree with Judge Learned Hand, in the view
stated for the Circuit Court of Appeals in
Kulick's case, that upon the sum of our
decisions, regardless of the variety of
statement in the opinions, no more definite
rule is to be drawn out than that 'the writ
is available, not only to determine points
of jurisdiction, stricti juris, and constitutional questions; but whenever else resort
to it is necessary to prevent a complete
miscarriage of justice.' 157 F. 2d 811, 813.
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"In my opm~on not only is this the law,
measured by the sum of the decisions and the
applicable statute, but the aggregate of the
results demonstrates it should be the law.

"Confusion in the opinions there is in
quantity. But is arises in part from the
effort to pin down what by its nature cannot
be confined in special, all-inclusive categories, unless the office of the writ is to
be diluted or destroyed where that should
not happen. And so limitation in assertion
gives way to the necessity for achieving
the writ's historic purpose when the two
collide. Admirable as may be the effort
toward system, this last resort for human
liberty cannot yield when the choice is between tolerating its wrongful deprivation
and maintaining the systematist's art.
"The writ should be available whenever there clearly has been a fundamental
miscarriage of justice for which no other
adequate remedy is presently available. Beside executing its great object, which is
the preservation of personal liberty and
assurance against its wrongful deprivation,
considerations of economy of judicial time
and procedures, important as they undoubtedly are, become comparatively insignificant.
This applies to situations involving the
past existence of a remedy presently foreclosed, as well as to others where no such
remedy has every been afforded ••• "
One of the leading cases on the office of
the writ of habeas corpus and one which indicates
that the rule Which scrupulously protects the
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jurisdiction of courts will yield in the face of
exceptional circumstances to the power of the
writ of habeas corpus is BOWEN v. JOHNSTON, 306

u.s.

19, 59

s. ct.

442 (1939).

The petitioner had been convicted of murder
in federal District Court, the act having occurred

in a National Park in Georgia.

He sought a writ

of habeas corpus on grounds that he had been
wrongly tried in federal court, the United States
not having exclusive jurisdiction of the park.
The court held that the United States

ha~

juris-

diction within the park and affirmed the denial
of the writ.

Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, however,

on page 25 {U.S.), considered the rule that
"Where on the face of the record the District
Court has jurisdiction of the offense and of
the defendant and the defendant contends that
on the facts shown the crime was not committed
at a place within the jurisdiction of the United
States,

~··

the judgment is one for review by the
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Circuit Court of Appeals in error proceedings
and ••• the writ of habeas corpus is properly
refused" and on page 26 (u.s.), made the following comment:
·~ut the rule, often broadly stated,
is not to be taken to mean that the mere
fact that the court which tried the petitioner had assumed jurisdiction, necessarily
deprives another court of authority to grant
a writ of habeas corpus. As the Court said
in the case of Coy, supra, pp. 757, 758, the
broad statement of the rule was certainly
not intended to go so far as to mean, for
example, 'that because a federal court tries
a prisoner for an ordinary common law offense,
as burglary, assault and battery, or larceny,
with no averment or proof of any offense
against the Unites States, or any connection
with a statute of the United States, and
punishes him by imprisonment, he cannot be
released ~ habeas corpus because the court
which tried him had assumed jurisdiction.'
Despite the action of the trial court, the
absence of jurisdiction may appear on the
face of the record (see In re Snow, supra;
Hans Nielsen, Petitioner, Supra, P. 183)
and the remedy of habeas corpus may be
needed to release the prisoner from a punishment imposed by a court without jurisdiction to pass judgment.

"It must never be forgotten that the
writ of habeas corpus is the precious safeguard of personal liberty and there is no
higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired.
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Ex parte Lange, supra. The rule requiring
resort to appellate procedure when the trial
court has determined its own jurisdiction of
an offense is not a rule denying the power to
issue a writ of habeas corpus when it appears
that nevertheless the trial court was without jurisdiction. The rule is not one defining power but one which relates to the
appropriate exercise of power. It has special application where there are essential
questions of fact determinable by the trial
court. ·Rodman v. Pothier, supra. It is
applicable also to the determination in
ordinary cases of disputed matters of law
whether they relate to the sufficiency of
the indictment or to the validity of the
statute on which the charge is based. Id.;
Glasgow v. Moyer, supra; Henry v. Henkel,
supra. But it is equally true that the rule
is not so inflexible that it may not yield
to exceptional circumstances where the need
for the remedy afforded by the writ of
habeas corpus is apparent."

In EX PARTE LANGE, 18 Wallace 163, 85 U.S.
18 (1873), a leading case on double jeopardy and
habeas corpus, the Supreme Court of the United
States discharged a prisoner on a writ of habeas
corpus after the district oourt, which had convicted him, imposed a second sentence, the first
sentence imposed having been contrary to statute,
holding that this resentencing and holding of the
60
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prisoner in custody thereunder
jeopardy.

constituted double

The court was confronted with the rule

that a court may set aside or modify its own judgments during the term at which they are made but
ruled that this power cannot be so used as to
violate the guarantees of personal rights found
in the common law, and in the constitutions of

the States and of the Union.

In its opinion dis-

charging the prisoner, the court, Mr. Justice
Miller writing, said, at page 178:
"There is no more sacred duty of a court
than, in a case properly before it, to maintain unimpaired those securities for the personal rights of the individual which have received for ages the sanction of the jurist
and the statesman; and in such cases no narrow or illiberal construction should be
given to the words of the fundamental law
in which they are embodied."
Another case of importance on this particular
question, the rule of which is still the law, is
EX PARTE IN THE MATTER OF HANS NIELSEN, APPT.,

131 U.S. 176, 9 S. Ct. 672, 33 L. Ed. 118 (1889).
The petitioner had been convicted of unlawful
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cohabitation in the Utah Territorial District Court
and had served his sentence.

He was then tried

and convicted of adultery covering the same period
of time as for the conviction for unlawful cohabitation and involving the same polygamous wife.
The petitioner filed an application for a writ
of habeas corpus on the grounds that he had been
twice convicted for the same offense.

The lower

court refused to give the petitioner any relief
by habeas corpus on grounds that the judgment

of

conviction, being regular on its face, could not
be challenged collaterally.

The United States

Supreme Court reversed the lower court, holding
that habeas corpus would lie and did so in a
unanimous opinion written by Mr. Justice Bradley.
The reasoning of the court is as follows:
rtThe objection to the remedy of habeas
corpus, of course, would be that there was
in force a regular judgment of conviction,
which could not be questioned collaterally,
as it would have to be on habeas corpus. But
there are exceptions to this rule which have
more than once been acted upon by this court.
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It is firmly established that i f the court
which renders a judgment has not jurisdiction to render it, either because the
proceedings or the law under which they are
taken are unconstitutional, or for any other
reason, the judgment is void and may be
questioned collaterally, and a defendant
who is imprisoned under and ~ virtue of it
may be discharged from custody on habeas
corpus. This was so decided in the cases
of EX PARTE LANGE, 85 U. S. 18, and EX PARTE
SIEBOLD, 100 U.S. 371, and in several other
cases referred to therein.
nrn the case of RE SNOW, 120 U. s. 274,
we held that only one indictment and conviction of the crime of unlawful cohabitation,
under the Act of 1882, could be had for the
time preceding the indictment because the
crime was a continuous one and was but a
single crime until prosecuted; that a second
conviction and punishment of the same crime
for any part of said period was an excess
of authority on the part of the District
Court of Utah; and that a habeas corpus would
lie for the discharge of the defendant imprisoned on such conviction. • •• It was
laid down ~ this court in RE COY, 127 U.S.
731, that the power of Congress to pass a
statute under which a prisoner is held in
custody may be inquired into under a writ
of habeas corpus as affecting the jurisdiction of the court which ordered his imprisonment; and the court, speaking by Mr.
Justice Miller, adds: 'And if their want
of power appears on the face of the record
of his condemnation, whether in the indictment or elsewhere, the court which has
authority to issue the writ is bound to
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release him •••

"In the present case, it is true, the
ground for the habeas corpus was, not the
invalidity of an Act of Congress under
which the defendant was indicted, but a second prosecution and trial for the same offense,
contrary to an express provision of the constitution. In other words, a constitutional
immunity of the defendant was violated by
the second trial and judgment. It is difficult to see why conviction and punishment
under an unconstitutional law is more violative of a person's constitutional rights,
than an unconstitutional conviction and
punishment under a valid law. In the first
case, it is true, the court has no authority
to take cognizance of the case, but, in the
other, it has no authority to render judgment
against the defendant. This was the case
on EX PARTE LANGE where the court had authority to hear and determine the case, but it
had no authority to give the judgment it did.
It was the same in the case of Snow: the
court had authority over the case, but we
held it had no authority to give judgment
against the prisoner. He was protected by
a constitutional provision, securing to
him a fundamental right. It was not a case
of mere error in law, but a case of denying to a person a constitutional right. And
where such a case appears on the record, the
party is entitled to be discharged from imprisonment. The distinction between the case
of a mere error in law, and of one in which
the judgment is void, is pointed out in EX
PARTE SIEBOLD, and is illustrated by the
case of EX PARTE PARKS as compared with the
cases of Lange and Snow. In the case of
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Parks there was an alleged misconstruction
of a statute. We held that to be a mere
error in law, the court having jurisdiction
of the case. In the cases of Lange and Snow,
there was a denial or invasion of a constitutional right. A party is entitled to a
habeas corpus, not merely where the court
is without jurisdiction of the cause, but
where it has no constitutional authority
or power to condemn the prisoner. As
said by Chief Baron Gilbert in a passage
quoted in Ex Parte Parks, 93 u.s. 18:
1 If the committment be against law, as being made by one who had no jurisdiction of
the cause, or for a matter for which qy law
no man ought to be punished, the court are
to discharge.• This was said in reference
to cases which had gone to conviction and
sentence. Lord Hale laid down the same
doctrine in almost the same words. (2 Hale
P.C. 144). ~nd why should not such a rule
prevail in favorem libertatis? If we have
seemed to hold the contrary in any case,
it has been from inadvertance. The law
could hardly be stated with more categorical accuracy than it is in the opening sentence of EX PARTE WILSON, 114 U.S. 417, where
Mr. Justice Gray, speaking for the court,
said: 1 It is well settled by a series of
decisions that this court, having no jurisdiction of criminal cases by writ of error
or appeal, cannot discharge on habeas corpus
a person imprisoned under the sentence of
a circuit or district court in a criminal
case unless the sentence exceeds +he jurisdiction of that court, or there is no authority to hold him under that sentence.•
This proposition, it is true, relates to
the power of this court to discharge on
65
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habeas corpus persons sentenced by the circuit
and district courts; but with regard to the
power of discharging on habeas corpus, it is
generally true that, after conviction and
sentence, the writ only lies when the sentence
exceeds the jurisdiction of the court, or
there is no authority to hold the defendant
under it. In the present case, the sentence
given was beyond the jurisdiction of the court,
because.it was against an express prov1s1on
of the constitution, which bounds and limits
all jurisdiction. tt
A Utah case which goes into the broad nature
of the writ of habeas corpus and which indicates
that the rule contended for by the Appellants will
yield to exceptional circumstanres is THOMPSON v.
HARRIS, 106 Utah 32, 144 P. (2d) 761 (1943).

The

cases involved sentences under the Habitual
Criminal Act and the applicability of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and came before the court on
applications for writs of habeas corpus.

Mr.

Chief Justice 1>/olfe in his opinion denying the
writs, at page 766 (P.), dealt with the question
of the scope of review on habeas corpus as follows:
"It is often stated that the scope of
review on habeas corpus is limited to the
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examination of the jurisdiction of the court
whose judgment of conviction is questioned.
We must never lose sight, however, of the
fact that habeas corpus is the precious
safeguard of personal liberty. That jurisdictional questions only are reachable by
the writ is not such an inflexible rule as
cannot yield to exceptional circumstances.
It may be better to say that the rule which
apparently limits the scope of the writ to
jurisdictional questions is not a rule of
limitation, but a rule of defining the
the appropriate spheres in which the power
should be exercised. Thus it has been held
that the writ will lie if the petitioner has
been deprived of one of his constitutional
rights such as due process of law. See
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct.
1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357;
Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 59 S. Ct.
442, 83 L. Ed. 455."

If the abuse is sufficiently great a court
may by habeas corpus relieve from an unlawful
restraint even in cases where on the face of the
record of the restraining court all things were
in order.

That such a use of the writ of habeas

corpus requires exceptional circumstances is
certainly true, but just as true is it that when
such circumstances exist the power of the courts
in exercising the great writ is such that it will
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cut quickly and cleanly through the narrow rules
ordinarily restricting its use and will restore
liberty unjustly restrained.
As pointed out in the argument under Point 2,
and by the cases therein discussed, the District
Court in the instant case, by virtue of its own
jurisdiction and not by interference with the
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, and by the
very nature of this case, had certain duties
imposed upon it which required it to place the custody of these children so that their best interests
would be served.

The parents sought the children.

Their desires were opposed by the State Department
of Public Welfare which claimed the right to custody.

The District Court had to decide the facts

and determine the issues.

In so doing it acted

properly within its own jurisdiction.
The District Court could not escape the obligation of determining the question of custody.
Its duty to do so in a case of this nature is not
~
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a duty peculiar to courts of this State.

In

California the proper disposition of the children must be made by the court in addition to
deciding the legality of the restraint.

A case

pointing this out is EX PARTE McDANIEL, 90 Cal.
App. 307, 265 P. 884 (1928).

The mother of chil-

dren had failed in an attempt to obtain their
custody by habeas corpus, the court below in that
action having awarded the custody to their aunt.
The District Court of Appeals had before it the
question of the duty of the court below, having
the question of custody of minors before it, to
award that custody as it saw fit.

The court

considered the question and stated, as follows:
"It thus appears that, notwithstanding
the main feature of the proceeding was the
question of the legal right of the respondent
to the custody of the children, in effect a
judicial determination was had of what possibly might be termed the subsidiary or
dependent question of the proper disposition
to be made of the children. While ordinarily
it may be said that the function of the writ
of habeas corpus is to determine only the
legality of the detention of a person under
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restraint of his liberty (13 Cal. Jur. 217,
and note), in cases involving the custody of
infants, the rule seems to be relaxed and
extended so that the determination of the
matter may include an order looking to the
best interests of the children (13 Cal. Jr.
279). 11
A similar rule is pronounced by the Maine
Court in MERCHANT v. BUSSELL, 139 Me.ll8, 27 A.
(2d) 816 (1942).

The case involved a custody

fight between a grandmother, in whose care a minor
child had been left, and the father, who sought
custody.

The court below denied the father's

request and awarded custody to the grandmother.
The father objected to the court's awarding of
custody, contending that its only jurisdiction
was to order a release or refuse to do so.

The

court said, on page 818 (A),
"A writ of habeas corpus is ordinarily
a proper remedy for a parent who claims to
have been unlawfully deprived of the custody
of a child. Generally speaking, the object
of a writ of habeas corpus is to release one
from an illegal restraint. In the case of
an adult, who may go his own way, no more is
required. An infant of tender years must,
however, be in the custody of someone, and
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to do no more than order a release would as
a rule be a futility. In such cases courts
have accordingly gone farther and have entered orders providing for custody."
The New York courts follow the rule, as indicated by PEOPLE EX REL KLEE v. KLEE, 195 N.Y.S.

778 (1922).

The court considered the question

of the power of a court on habeas corpus involving
a minor to award custody by looking into the history
of the use of the writ in such cases.

On page

780, the court states:
"When as early as 1819, the writ was
issued to obtain the custody of a child, it
was granted by Chancellor Kent, who observed
that - 1 the object of the court was to release the infant from all improper restraint,
and not to try in this summary way, the question of guardianship, or to deliver the infant
over t0 the custody of another; that the course
and practice of the courts in these cases was
only to deliver the party from illegal restraint, and if competent to form and declare
an election, then to allow the infant to go
where she pleased, and if the infant be too
young to form a judgment, then the court is
to exercise its judgment for the infant.'
Matter of Wollstonecraft, 4 Johns. Ch. 80."
The rule is recognized by the Virginia Court
in BUCHANAN v. BUCHANAN, 170 Va. 458, 197 S.E. 426,
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116 A.L.R. 688 (1938).

The court considered the

nature of habeas corpus in these cases as follows
(page 691, A.L.R.):
"The primary object of habeas corpus is
to determine the legality of the restraint
under which a person is held. As applied to
infants, the primary object is to determine
in whose custody the best interests of the
infants will probably be advanced. In determining such custody, the natural rights of
the parents are entitled to due consideration.
'By immemorial tradition the aim of habeas
corpus is a justice that is swift and summary' • • •
"In Armstrong v. Stone and Wife, 9 Grat.
102, 50 Va. 102 the court said:
• ••• Whilst,
therefore, it is undoubtedly true that the
proper office of the writ is to release from
illegal restraint, and, where the party is of
years of discretion and sui juris, nothing
more is done than to discharge him; yet, if
he be not of an age to determine for himself,
the court or judge must decide for him, and
make an order for his being placed in the
proper custody. ' "
The District Court simply followed the wellrecognized rule and performed the duties imposed
upon it thereby , being very careful to refrain
from depriving the Juvenile Court of what the
Appellants, on page 9 of their brief, refer to as
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"its continuing jurisdiction over the children
previously acquired by that court under authority
of Section 55-10-5 (3), U.C.A. 1953."

CONCLUSION
The District Court in its handling of this
matter proceeded properly in all respects.

That

court was charged with certain obligations, having before it children whose custody was in dispute.

Those obligations it performed in complete

accord with the law in cases of this nature.

The

nature of the proceeding as in habeas corpus required the court to decide whether the children
were illegally restrained.

Having decided that

they were illegally restrained, the District Court,
under the doctrine of the cases, had to decide who
should have custody of the children.

Since their

parents sought custody, the District Court was required to determine the fitness of the parents.
To do so, it heard testimony, made findings of fact
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and conclusions of law, all of which was within
its jurisdiction.

The findings of fact and con-

elusions of law compelled the District Court to
restore the custody of these children to their parents, which restoration it made on certain conditions,
being careful not to disturb the continuing jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court.
We cannot conclude with the Appellants that
the discharge of the children "would have accomplished the object of, and satisfied the purpose of, the
writ of habeas corpus."

In restoring the custody

of the children to the parents, the District Court,
acted within its jurisdiction and in complete accord with law governing the type of case it had
before it.
Respectfully submitted,
HORACE J. KNOWLTON
ROBERT J. SCHUM

Attorneys for Respondents
214 Tenth Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah
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